Propositional dynamic logic is a formal system for reasoning about the before-after behavior of regular program schemes. An extension of propositional dynamic logic which includes both an infinite looping construct and a converse or backtracking construct is considered and it is proved that the satisfiability problem for this logic is elementarily decidable. In order to establish this result, deterministic two-way automata on infinite trees are defined, and it is shown how they can be simulated by nondeterministic one-way automata. The satisfiability problem for propositional dynamic logic of looping and converse is then reduced to the emptiness problem for these two-way automata.
INTRODUCTION
Dynamic logic (Pratt, 1976 (Pratt, , 1979 Harel, 1979; Fischer and Ladner, 1979) applies concepts from modal logic to a relational semantics of programs to yield various systems for reasoning about the before-after behavior of programs. Analogous to the modal logic assertions ~p (possibly p) and ff]p (necessarily p) are the dynamic logic constructs (a)p and [a]p.
If a is a program and p is an assertion about the state of a computation, then
(a)p asserts that after executing a, p can be the case, and [a]p asserts that after executing a, p must be the case.
A dynamic logic includes both a programming language for representing programs and an assertion language for expressing properties of computation states; different dynamic logics result from the selection of different programming and assertion languages. The underlying assertion language of propositional dynamic logic or PDL (Fischer and Ladner, 1979 ) is the propositional calculus; its programming language consists of regular expressions over uninterpreted program labels, i.e., the programming primitives are black box programs, and more complicated programs are built up using the nondeterministic control structures of sequencing, choosing, and iterating.
Although PDL can express many interesting properties of programs, Pratt has shown that it is not powerful enough to capture the notion of infinite looping in regular programs (Pratt, 1978) . However, by adding a natural formula construct to PDL, we obtain a programming logic strong enough to express a useful propositional notion of infinite looping. The resuiting logic is also strong enough to express all formulae of two other propositional logics of programs: Propositional Algorithmic Logic (Mirkowska, 1980) and Temporal Logic of Branching Time (Ben-Ari, Manna, and Pnueli, 1981) .
A striking feature of PDL is that it satisfies the following finite model property: an arbitrary (perhaps infinite) model of a PDL formula p can be reduced to a small finite model of p by merging those states which satisfy exactly the same subformulae of p. This property plays a key role in the known decision procedures for PDL (Fischer and Ladner, 1979; Pratt, 1979) . This technique does not extend to PDL with looping, since there is a formula which is satisfiable in an infinite model which cannot be reduced to a finite model by merging states. This formula is therefore not equivalent to any PDL formula, and so PDL with looping is strictly more expressive than PDL. Nevertheless, PDL with looping is decidable and does satisfy a finite model property (Streett, 1980 (Streett, , 1982 .
Pratt's original formulation of dynamic logic included the programming construct converse (Pratt, 1976) . Given a program a, the converse of a is the program which runs a backwards, i.e., which undoes the computation performed by a. PDL with converse satisfies the same finite model property as PDL and the known decision procedures for PDL extend without difficulty to include the converse construct (Fischer and Ladner, 1979; Pratt, 1979) .
Looping and converse interact to make PDL with looping and converse significantly different from either PDL with just looping or PDL with just converse. The resulting logic does not satisfy the finite model property: there is a formula satisfiable in an infinite model but not in any finite model. This proves that PDL with both constructs is strictly more expressive than either sublogic. The failure of a logic to satisfy the finite model property is often taken as an indication of undecidability, but in this case the evidence is misleading; PDL with looping and onverse is in fact elementarily decidable.
There is a straightforward proof of the decidability of PDL with looping by embedding it into SnS, the second order theory of several successors (Streett, 1979) . (This method was used by Parikh (1978) to prove the decidability of his Second Order Acyclic Process Logic or SOAPL.) The upper bound on complexity obtained in this way is not elementary, since SnS cannot be decided in elementary time (Meyer, 1974) . In any case, there does not appear to be a straightforward translation of the converse construct into SnS. Models of formulae of either SOAPL or PDL with looping can be viewed as labelled graphs. These graphs can be unravelled or unwound into treestructured models in which programs conform to the tree structure, i.e., programs connect nodes only to their descendants in the tree. The translation of these logics into SnS depends crucially on this fact. The decidability of SnS can be established via a reduction to the emptiness problem of automata on infinite trees (Rabin, 1969 ). An elementary time decision procedure of PDL with looping can be obtained by directly reducing satisfiability to this emptiness problem, bypassing the translation in SnS (Streett 1980 (Streett , 1982 . The reduction involves the construction, for each formula p, of an automaton which accepts, in a sense, models of p. It follows by automata theoretic arguments that every satisfiable formula has a finitely generable model, i.e., a model obtained by unravelling a finite graph. It is not difficult to show that this finite graph is itself a model, so that the introduction of the looping construct does not destroy the finite model property (Streett, 1980 (Streett, , 1982 .
Models of formulae of PDL with looping and converse are also labelled graphs and these graphs can also be unwound into tree-structured models. However, unlike the tree models for the previous logics, the presence of the converse construct destroys the relationship between programs and tree structure; programs can link arbitrary nodes of the tree. The presence of such programs prevents a straightforward reduction of PDL with looping and converse to the emptiness problem for automata on infinite trees. However, the semantics of the converse construct suggests a definition of deterministic two-way automata on infinite trees such that the satisfiability problem for the extended logic is reducible to the emptiness problem for these newly defined automata. Decidability of the logic follows from a reduction of the two-way emptiness problem to the ordinary or one-way emptiness problem.
Although there is no finite model property, the models of a formula of PDL with looping and converse are recognizable by a finite automaton. As before, it follows that every satisfiable formula has a finitely generable model, i.e., a model obtained by unravelling a finite graph. Although in general this finite graph is not a model of the original formula, it is a finite representation of a model. This clarifies why the logic is decidable.
SYNTAX, SEMANTICS, AND EXPRESSIVE POWER
We let A, B, C ..... denote elements from an infinite set of atomic programs and P, Q, R ..... denote elements from an infinite set of atomic formulae. and u, =v and Uo<(a~sUl, ul~a~sU2 ..... u, _~a~sUn ,
If a and b are programs, then a; b is the program which executes first a, then b. The programming connectives L) and * are nondeterministic; if a and b are programs, then a U b is a program which permits a choice of either a or b, and a* is a program which permits a choice of some number (possibly zero) of iterations of a. If a is a program, then a-is the converse of a, i.e., it undoes the computations performed by a (however, since a can take several input states to the same output state, doing a followed by a-can result in a change of state). If a is a program, then Aa is a formula which is true whenever there is a way to repeatedly execute the program a ad infinitum.
Additional Boolean operations can be defined as abbreviations: p A q =df--~(--~P V -~q), p --, q =dr~p V q, p ~ a =dr (P -' q) A (q --, p). If a is a program and p is a formula, then a-~p or [alp, the weakest precondition of a with respect to p, is a formula characterizing exactly those states from which all terminating computations of a lead to final states satisfying p. Weakest preconditions can be defined as follows:
is a program and p is a formula, then p ~ a, the strongest postcondition of a with respect to p, is a formula characterizing exactly those states which can be reached, via a computation of a, from an initial state satisfying p (de Bakker, 1980) . The converse construct can be used to define strongest postconditions as follows: p ~-a =dr (a-)p. The formula Aa indicates that the program a* can diverge, i.e., enter a nonhalting computation. A formula ooa, which is true of a program a exactly when a can enter a nonhalting computation or infinite loop, can be defined inductively as follows:
This looping construct is useful in expressing total correctness of programs.
Remark. Many formulations of PDL include a test construct. If p is a formula, then p? is a program which permits program execution to proceed if p is true and abnormally terminates program execution if p is false. The semantics of tests in a structure S are given by the following condition:
u-<p?>-sV iff u = v and u ~s P. Informally, p? is equivalent to ifp then skip else abort. Tests can be used to define strucutred programming constructs: tf p then a else b =dr (P?; a)u (~p?; b) and while p do a =dr (P?; a)*;-~p?.
Tests are not considered in this paper, but all results continue to hold in the presence of tests. For details, see Streett (1982) . DEFINITION 2.4. If p is a formula and S is a structure, then S is a model of p or S satisfies p if and only if u ~s P for some u E U, and p is satisfiable if and only if some structure satisfies p. The formula p is valid in S if and only if u ~s P for all u E U, and p is valid if and only if p is valid in all structures. The following theorems rank PDL with looping and converse and some of its sublogics with respect to expressive power. Theorem 2.7 establishes a property of formulae of PDL with converse which Theorem 2.8 shows is not shared by all formulae of PDL with looping. We conclude that PDL with looping is more expressive than PDL and that PDL with converse does not express PDL with looping. Theorems 2.9 and 2.10 establish that PDL with both constructs is more expressive than PDL with looping. Finally, Theorems 2.12 and 2.13 show that PDL with converse is more expressive than PDL and that PDL with looping does not express PDL with converse, so that PDL with converse and PDL with looping are incomparable in expressive power. DEFINITION 2.6. Given a formula p and structures S = (U, ~s , < > s ) ,and T = (V, ~r , ~ > r ) , a p-homomorphism from S to T is an onto map f : U-~ V such that for all slates u C U, u ~s P iff f ( u )~ r p and for all atomic programs A appearing in p and states u, vC U, u<A~sv iff f ( u )~A~r f ( v ) . If a p-homomorphism from S to T exists, we call T a pquotient of S. THEOREM 2.7 (Fischer and Ladner, 1979 Proof Consider an infinite structure S consisting of a single infinite reverse A-chain, i.e., U = {un}~> 0 and ui~A~su i iff i = j + 1. Then u ~s~AA for every state u. Suppose f is a AA-homomorphism from S to a finite structure T, so that for all u E U, f ( u )~r -~A . Since T is finite we must have f ( u ) = f ( v ) for some u=/:v, implying f ( u )~A ; A * > r f ( u ) and f(u) ~TAA, a contradiction. II THEOREM 2.9 (Streett, 1980 (Streett, , 1982 
Proof Consider the satisfiable formula AA A ~( A * ) A ( A -) .

If
U o~s A A A~( A * ) A ( A -) , then Uo~sAA and U o~s~( A * ) A ( A -). Hence there is an infinite A chain uo<A>su 1 ... un<A~su,+ 1 .... If u i -=uj for any i < j, then u i ~s A ( A -) and so u o ~s (A * ) A ( A -) , a contradiction. So all the u i are distinct. Hence, AA A-~(A*)A(A-)
is satisfiable only in infinite models. II DEFINIa]ON 2.11. A structure S is a one-to-one structure if for all atomic programs A, the relation -<A~ s is one-to-one, i.e., for all states u, v, w E U, if u<(A~ s v and w-<A~ s v then u = w. THEOREM 2.12. PDL with looping satisfies the one-to-one model property; every satisfiable formula is satisfied in a one-to-one model.
Proof. Given any structure S=(U,~s,<>-s),
define a structure T= (U+,~r,< ~r), where U + is the set of nonempty sequences of states from U. For all atomic propositions P and states v E U +, let v ~rP iff last (v)~ s P. For all atomic programs A and states u, v C V, let u<A~rv iff v = ulast(v) and last(u)<A~ s last (v) . By construction T is one-to-one. It is not difficult to show that for all formulae p and states v E U +, v ~r P iff last (v) 
Proof. Consider the satisfiable formula P A (A)(A)~P.
Suppose u ~s P A (A)(A-)--, P, where S is one-to-one. Then u ~s P and there is a state v such that uA~ s v and v ~s (A -) ~ P, so that there must be a state w such that w<A~sv and w ~s~P. Since S is one-to-one, u---w. But this is impossible, since we have u ~s P and w ~s---a°-II PDL with looping is also strong enough to express all formulae of the Propositional Algorithmic Logic of Mirkowska (1980) and the Temporal Logic of Branching Time of Ben-Ari, Manna, and Pnueli (1981) . For details, see Streett (1982) .
Two-WAY AUTOMATA ON INFINITE TREES
Automata on infinite trees, called one-way automata in this section to distinguish them from the two-way variant defined below, have been extensively studied (Rabin, 1969; Hossley and Rackoff, 1972) . We briefly review some fundamental definitions. THEOREM 3.8 (Rabin, 1969; Hossley and Rackoff, 1972) . The emptiness problem for an infinite tree automaton A, i.e., the problem of deciding whether or not A accepts any tree at all, is elementarily decidable.
Analogously to two-way automata on finite strings, we can define twoway automata on infinite trees. Two-way automata compute along all infinite paths through a tree, i.e., i.e., computations begin at all the nodes of the tree and branch in all directions, including back towards the root. It is technically convenient to allow two-way automata to distinguish the root from all other nodes. Theorem 3.30 shows how to simulate deterministic twoway automata by nondeterministic one-way automata; it is an open problem whether this result can be extended to nondeterministic two-way automata.
First, however, two-way infinite paths through infinite trees are defined, and some simple results proved about the structure of such paths. Proof The path ~r must contain a least element x. Let cr be a (possibly empty) initial segment of lr preceding some occurrence of x in zr. Let Y0 be x and let r 0 be that segment of 7r which extends from o to include the last occurrence of x in 7r, so that r 0 is a loop on Y0. Inductively, given Yn and 75n= {Xm}L<~m<M , let Yn+l =XM+I and let rn+ 1 be that segment of 7r which extends from a; %;...; r n to include the last occurrence of y,+~ in ~z, so that r,+~ is a loop on Yn+~. The reader can verify that {Yn}n>0 is an infinite oneway path. II MN(s, a) ). Informally, if A is in state s on a node labelled a, then A will be in state Mn(s, tr) on the nth neighbor of that node.
(e) G ~_ Powerset (S) is a collection of acceptable sets of states. Infor-mally, A accepts a tree if for every infinite two-way path n, G contains the set of states entered infinitely often along 7r. L e m m a 3.12 shows that an infinite path 7r can take only two forms: either zc loops endlessly on a single node or else 7r passes through all the nodes of an infinite forward path, possibly looping on each one. This suggests that a one-way automata might be able to simulate a two-way automata by successively guessing state information about the loops on each node. This method of simulation is successful because it is possible for an automaton to check that the guesses include information about all possible loops. DEFINITION 3.18. Given an automaton A and a tree f, a plan for A on f is an infinite N-ary Cs-tree g such that for all x ~ T~. :
s,O,s) E g(x) and y is the nth neighbor of x, then (M,(s,f(x)), 0, Mn(s,f(x)))@ g(y), (d) if (s,X,t)Eg(x) and (t, Y, u) C g(x) with X, Y4:0, then (s,X• {t}U Y, u)~ g(x), in which case the resulting circuit is called the join of the original two, (e) if (s, 0, s) C g(x), y is the nth neighbor of x, x is the mth neighbor of y, and (M,(s, f(x)), Y, u)C g(y), then (s, XU {t, u}, Mm(s, f(y)) ) ~ g(x)
, in which case the resulting circuit is called the expansion of the first one.
Conditions (a)-(e) are intended to force a plan to include circuits for all possible loops through a tree, but they do not rule out the presence of spurious circuits which do not correspond to any loop. The least or minimal plan, however, contains precisely the circuits for all loops.
LEMMA 3.19. For each automaton A and tree f, there is a plan gm~n for A onfsuch that for allplans g for A onfand nodes x, gmin(X)_~ g(x).
Proof Define gm~n as the pointwise intersection of all plans for A on f. I DEFINITION 3.20. Given a plan g for a tree f and an infinite forward path {xn}, a series is an infinite sequence /(sn, X,,, t,)} of linked circuits on {x,}, i.e., for all n, (s,,X,, t,)E g(xn) and s,+ l = M(tn,f(x,) ) if x,,+l is the mth neighbor of x,. The two goodness conditions correspond to the two forms, cyclic and acyclic, of infinite two-way paths. A circuit of the form (s, X, s) indicates that the automaton can cycle endlessly through the set XU {s} of states while travelling over a cyclic path, while a series describes the state history of the automaton on an acyclic path.
LEMMA 3.23. There is a good plan for an automaton A on a tree f if and only if the minimal plan is good.
Proof The goodness conditions ensure that any plan included in a good plan is also good, hence the minimal plan (which is included in every plan) must be good if any plan is good. II
The next series of lemmas shows that the minimal plan contains precisely the circuits for all loops. In what follows let gmln be the minimal plan for an automaton A on a treef and let p be the run ofA onf. Proof For circuits of the form ( s , O , x ) , the required loop is the singleton x. If (s,X, t) is the join of two circuits (t, Y, u) and (u, Z, v) , then inductively there must be loops x; a; x and x; r; x for the component circuits (since Y, Z 4:-0, these loops cannot be singletons). The required loop for the join is x ; a ; x ; r ; x . If ( s , X , t ) is the expansion of a circuit (t, Y,y) on a neighbor y of x, then inductively there must be a loop a on y for (t, Y, u). The required loop for the expansion is x; a;x. II LEMMA 3.27. For all paths r; 7c ending in a loop ~ on a node x, there is a circuit ( s , X , t ) @ gmi~(x) such that s = p ( r ; x ) , X = t P~) I r ; x </t < r; re}, and t ---p(v; ~z).
Proof If ~ is the singleton x, the required circuit (p(r; x), O,p(v; x)) C groin(x) by Lemma 3.25. If 7~ = x; a; x with a a loop on a neighbor y of x, then inductively there must be a circuit for a on y. The required circuit for on x is an expansion of the circuit for a on y. If a is not a loop, then by L e m m a 3.11 it must contain x, i.e., a --a 0 ; x ; a 1. Inductively there must be circuits for x; a o ; x and x; a I ; x. The required circuit for ~z is the join of these two circuits. |
LEMMA 3.28. An automaton A accepts a tree f if and only if the minimal plan for A on f is good.
Proof First, suppose A rejects f Then there is an infinite path ~ such that Inf(p, 7r) ~ G. If ~z is cyclic on x, then 7r = r o ; a; rl, where a is a loop on x so large that p(v 0 ; x) = p(v o ; a) and {p(r 0 ; x) ..... p(r 0 ; a)} = Inf(p, ~r). By Lemma 27, g(x) will violate condition (a) in Definition 3.22. If, on the other hand, n is acyclic, then by Lemma 3.12 there is an infinite forward path {x,t such that ~ = a; r0; rl; ..., where each r n is a loop on x n. It is straightforward to select a series ~ of circuits for groin on {x,} violating condition (b) in Definition 3.22. Now suppose that the minimal plan is not good. Then either there is a node x with a bad circuit or an infinite forward path with a bad series. If there is a bad circuit (s, X, s) on x, use Lemmas 3.24 and 3.26 to construct a cyclic path 7r such that Inf(p, 70 =XU is} ~ G. If there is a bad series ~, use Lemmas 3.24 and 3.26 to construct an acyclic path 7r such that Inf(p, 70 = Inf(~)~G. I DEFINITION 3.29. If f and g are infinite trees, define the product tree f × g by (f X g)(x) = (f(x), g(x) ). Proof. It is straightforward to construct, in time elementary in the size of A, first, a one-way tree automaton C which accepts infinite (S × Cs)-trees f X g exactly when g is a plan for f, and second, a nondeterministic automaton D on infinite sequences of circuits which accepts precisely the sequences violating the goodness conditions. McNaughton (1966) gives an elementary time construction for a deterministic automaton on infinite sequences which accepts the sequences rejected by a given automaton. Let E be the result of applying this construction to D, and let F be the deterministic tree automaton which simulates E down every forward path, so that F accepts exactly the good plans. The desired automaton B, given an input tree f nondeterministically guesses a possible plan g and simulates F on g and C on f × g. By Lemmas 3.23 and 3.28, A and B accept the same trees. I Remark. The domain C s has size doubly exponential in the size of A's state space, and McNaughton's construction involves a further doubly exponential blowup, so that B has size quadruply exponential in the size of A.
THE SATISFIABILITY PROBLEM
In this section the automata theoretic result of the previous section is used to obtain an elementary decision procedure for PDL with looping and converse. First, however, we precisely define the notions of a subformula of a formula and an execution sequence of a program. DEFINITION 4.1. The Fischer-Ladner closure of a formula p is the least set of formulae FL(p) such that Proof. A straightforward extension of the corresponding proof for PDL (Fischer and Ladner, 1979) . I Programs with converse are 'extended regular expressions, and each program denotes a regular set of strings of literal programs, the set of its execution sequences. Note that the execution sequences of a-can be obtained by inverting all literal programs in the reversals of execution sequences of a. Proof. By structural induction on programs. | If p is a satisfiable formula, Theorem 4.9 shows that p has a special model, called a scheme, which is easily transformed into a tree suitable as input to a two-way automaton. A scheme is a tree-like structure in which p is satisfied at the root and diamond subformulae of p are satisfied along specified paths, enabling the truth value of these subformulae to be checked deterministically. Proof By Lemma 4.14, it is sufficient to construct an automaton accepting exactly the N + 1-ary SFtrees satisfying the conditions (a)-(h) of that lemma, where N is the number of diamond subformulae of p. It is straightforward to construct an automaton B with four states (two start states, an accepting state, and a failure state) which accepts exactly the trees satisfying conditions (a)-(c), (f), and (g). For 1 ~< n ~< N, let A, be a deterministic automaton on finite strings which accepts the regular set L(a,). Let C~ be an automaton on infinite trees which, for every node x in the tree labelled with (a~)q~ runs the automaton A~ down the path x; {xnOm}m)O, looking for an initial segment which is matched by the program a, and ends in a node labelled qn. Let D r be an automaton on infinite trees which, for every node x in the tree not labelled with (a~)q,, runs the automaton A, down every path starting with x, rejecting the tree if a, matches any finite path starting with x and ending with a node labelled q,.
Given an automaton recognizing a regular set X not containing the empty string, there is a construction, due to McNaughton (1966) , of a deterministic automaton on infinite strings which accepts exactly the infinite strings which cannot be parsed as infinite sequences of strings from X. For Aa C FL(p), let E a be the result of applying McNaughton's construction to an automaton accepting L(a)-{A I. Let F a be an automaton on infinite trees which, for every node x not labelled with Aa, runs the automaton Ea down every path from x in order to reject any tree containing a path from x which a repeatedly matches. Finally, the automaton B and the C~'s, Dr's, and F~'s can be combined in a crossproduct construction to yield the desired A D. II
Remark. McNaughton's construction involves a double exponential
blowup and is applied to deterministic automata constructed from regular expressions occurring in p. It follows that the number of states of A m is at worst triply exponential in the length of the formula p. THEOREM 4.16. The satisfiability problem for PDL with looping and converse is elementarily decidable.
Proof Given a formula p, Theorem 4.15 constructs a two-way automaton A m on infinite N + 1-ary trees such that A m accepts some tree if and only i f p is satisfiable. By Theorem 3.30, there is an equivalent one-way automaton B on infinite N + 1-ary trees. It is straightforward to construct a one-way automaton C on infinite binary trees, whose emptiness problem is equivalent to B's. The emptiness problem for one-way automata on infinite binary trees is elementarily decidable (Rabin, 1969; Hossley and Rackoff, 1972) . II Remark. The construction of the two-way automaton A m runs in time at worst triple exponential in the length of p; the one-way simulation by B entails a quadruply exponential blowup. The emptiness problem for one-way automata is decidable in time exponential in the number of states of the automaton tested. It follows that the above decision procedure runs in time at worst octuply exponential in the length of the formula tested. The observant reader will note that two-way automata are used to handle the converse construct and that one-way automata suffice for converse-free PDL with looping. This observation leads to a triply exponential time decision procedure for that logic (Streett, 1980 (Streett, , 1982 . Rabin (1969) has shown that every nonempty automaton recognizable set of infinite trees contains a finitely generable tree, i.e., an infinite tree which can be obtained by unwinding a finite graph. Although PDL with looping and converse does not satisfy the finite model property, Rabin's result shows that every satisfiable formula has a finite representation. In the case of converse-free formulae, however, it is possible to transform the generating graph for an image for the formula into a finite model (Streett, 1980 (Streett, , 1982 .
CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
Analysis of the elementary time decision procedure given in the preceding chapter shows that it runs in time at worst octuply exponential in the length of the formula tested. There is a large gap between this upper bound on the complexity of the satisfiability problem and the following lower bound established by Fischer and Ladner for PDL. THEOREM 5.1 (Fischer and Ladner, 1979) . There is a constant c > 1 such that PDL (and hence its extensions) cannot be decided in time c n, where n is the length of the formula tested. Pratt (1982) and Kozen (1982) have recently defined two distinct propositional versions of the mu-calculus (Park, 1969 (Park, , 1973 de Bakker and de Roever, 1973; Hitchcock and Park, 1973) . Both versions satisfy the finite model property and are decidable in exponential time. Pratt's logic can express PDL with converse, and Kozen's logic can express PDL with Aa for some but not all programs a. Since PDL with looping and converse does not satisfy the finite model property, it is not subsumed by either mu-calculus. It is an open problem whether the apparently incompatible features of the two versions can be reconciled, perhaps yielding an exponential time decision procedure for a still more powerful logic.
Since PDL is decidable, it has an uninteresting complete recursive axiomatisation: the set of all valid formulae. However, one would still like to find a simple and natural complete axiomatisation. In the case of PDL, a completeness proof for the following set of axioms was first announced by Segerberg (1977) ; the first complete proof is due to Parikh (1978) .
Axioms:
(1) All the tautologies of the propositional calculus In addition, Parikh (1978) to the above axiomatisation for PDL yields a complete axiomatisation for PDL with converse. A natural question to ask is whether there are one or more axioms concerning the A construct which, when added to the above complete axiomatisations for PDL with or without converse, yield complete axiomatisations for logics with looping.
